Notation-I indicator function f X (xj ) conditional density r X (xj ) conditional failure rate f X (x) predictive (marginal) density r X (x) predictive failure rate
INTRODUCTION
Suppose a lifetime X, conditional on the value of a rate , is judged to be exponentially distributed, i.e., f X (xj ) = e ? x I(x > 0). The conditional failure rate, r X (xj ) = f X (xj )=P(X > xj ) = does not depend on x. However,the failure rate of the predictive distribution of X is decreasing on x, for any choice of a prior density for . Formally,
is decreasing on x for any prior p on (0; +1).
This fact is sometimes seen as a paradox, as the model having constant failure rate yields a predictive distribution with decreasing failure rate. A Bayesian explanation of this -illusory -paradox was given by Barlow 1] . He identi ed r X (x) to di erent posterior means E( jX > x) of , given X > x, in order to explain the \paradox".
We present here the discrete version of the \paradox". We believe the discrete explanation adds further insight to the situation.
THE DISCRETE VERSION OF THE PARADOX
We will consider the geometric distribution as the discrete counterpart to the exponential density. The failure rate of a discrete random quantity N is de ned as r N (n) =P(N = n)=P(N > n ?1), for n = 1; 2; ::: The conditional failure rate of the geometric distribution, given the value of its parameter , is then is decreasing on n, for any choice of a prior density p (this fact is proved on the appendix).
THE EXPLANATION
We now argue that there is no paradox. Suppose a Bayesian watches the realization of consecutive Bernoulli trials. He does not know the value of the constant propensity for success, . His opinion, prior to the trials, is described by his personal prior density for it, p( ). After having observed (n ? 1) failures (and no success) his updated opinion about the possibility of a ( rst) success in the next trial is given by his conditional probability P(N = njN > n ? 1) , where N stands for \trial when the rst success happens". We have P(N = njN > n ? 1) = r N (n), the decreasing failure rate.
But this is not surprising: As n increases, and the rst success never happens, our Bayesian person is led by his current (posterior) densities p( jN > n ? 1) to increasing skepticism about the ocurrence of a success. His probabilities P(N = njN > n ?1) should, indeed, become smaller and smaller as time goes by and a success is never observed. Notice that this should happen regardless of which prior p( ) he had, as the sequence of failures makes him increasingly skeptical anyway.
DISCUSSION
The predictive failure rate of a conditional geometric model can only be decreasing. A person, regardless of which prior opinion p( ) he had, becomes more and more pessimistic about the occurrence of a rst success when only failures are observed by him. This is the corrected statement of the \law of maturity" that is much known to readers of sequences of Lotto results: A sequence of failures makes one believe a success is increasingly unlikely.
The correct statement of the law also amounts to Carnap's principle of instantial relevance (Plato 2] ) and can be shown to follow from exchangeability of trials -the full subjectivistic Bayesian description of Bernoulli trials.
